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I. INTRODUCTION 
Experts estimate that well-over half of the infrastructure1 
needed to accommodate population growth in the United States, by 
2050, does not yet exist.2 The demand for new, expanding 
infrastructure systems stems from existing funding shortages, 
necessary to maintain aging infrastructure, and worsening threats 
of infrastructure-failure.3 The risks posed by the United States’ 
underfunded and rapidly aging infrastructure are well 
documented.4 In light of these risks, the Trump Administration 
issued Executive Order No. 13807 (“the Order”) to facilitate 
drafting of federal legislation, which would improve the 
environmental review and permitting processes for infrastructure 
projects nationwide.5 The Order’s goals included identification of 
 
1. “Infrastructure,” as discussed in this paper, refers to road and transit 
systems, along with such critical elements of the nation’s surface transportation 
infrastructure, including highways, bridges, and commercial rail. However, 
arguments made within apply equally to utility infrastructure systems (e.g., 
drinking water, wastewater, and energy). 
2. Lisa Grow Sun, Smart Growth in Dumb Places: Sustainability, Disaster, 
and the Future of the American City, 2011 BYU L. REV. 2157, 2158–59 n.10 (2011) 
(citing Arthur C. Nelson & Robert E. Lang, The Next 100 Million: Reshaping of 
America’s Built Environment, PLAN., Jan. 2007, at 4 (estimating that the United 
States will reach a population of 400 million by 2037)). 
3. See AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD 4–
5 (2017), https://www. 
infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Full-2017-Report-
Card-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UBU-VZZL] [hereinafter REPORT CARD]; see 
also Eric Jaffe, America’s Infrastructure Crisis is Really a Maintenance Crisis, 
CITYLAB (Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.citylab.com/solutions/2015/02/americas-
infrastructure-crisis-is-really-a-maintenance-crisis/385452/ 
[https://perma.cc/J2XW-XL4W] (asserting recent deadly infrastructure failures - 
including an electrical malfunction on the D.C. Metrorail on January 12, 2015, 
and a series of incidents on New York City’s Metro-North commuter railroad 
between 2013 and 2014 - resulted from poor maintenance). 
4. See generally AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, FAILURE TO ACT: CLOSING THE 
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT GAP FOR AMERICA’S ECONOMIC FUTURE (2016), 
https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2016/05/2016-FTA-Report-Close-the-Gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ2J-T5DC] 
(noting that water and wastewater systems are examples of aging infrastructure) 
[hereinafter FAILURE TO ACT]; see also Steve Kroft, Falling Apart: America’s 
Neglected Infrastructure, CBS NEWS (Nov. 23, 2014), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/falling-apart-america-neglected-infrastructure/ 
[https://perma.cc/96XG-QUH5].  
5. Exec. Order. No. 13807, 82 Fed. Reg. 40,463, 40,466 (Aug. 24, 2017). 
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methods to increase public-private partnerships (“P3s”) needed to 
fund the maintenance and expansion of public infrastructure.6 
The Trump Administration released the Legislative Outline 
for Rebuilding Infrastructure in America (“the Plan”) on February 
12, 2018.7 The Plan, which “[estimated to] stimulate at least $1.5 
trillion. . .over the next 10 years,” advocates for limiting federal 
investments to under 20% of a project’s total cost, while also 
placing greater responsibility on states and municipalities to fund 
important infrastructure projects in partnerships with private-
sector firms.8 In order to transfer the responsibility of planning, 
funding, maintaining, and operating major infrastructure projects 
to states, municipalities, and the private-sector, the Plan depends 
on P3 agreements meeting demands for funds, resources, and 
expertise.9 The Plan also emphasizes investments in rural, over 
urban-infrastructure, and roadways, over transit-systems—
policies that are likely to promote sprawl.10 Any legislation 
developed from such policies will certainly (1) shift the 
responsibility of funding infrastructure projects from the federal 
government to private sources, (2) increase the need for P3s 
between both state- and-local governments and private-developers, 
and (3) move away from recent federal Smart Growth policies.11 
 
6. Id. at 40,463. 
7. THE WHITE HOUSE, LEGISLATIVE OUTLINE FOR REBUILDING 
INFRASTRUCTURE IN AMERICA (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/briefing-
room/304441/legoutline.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7ZF-FY8X] [hereinafter THE 
PLAN]. 
8. See id. at i, 3, 5. 
9. See id. at 3–4.  
10. See id. at 5–7. Although the Plan does discuss elimination of federal law 
that constrains funds available for capital transit projects, this single addition 
does little to counteract the overall policy. See id. at 20–25; see also Patricia E. 
Salkin, Smart Growth and Sustainable Development: Threads of a National Land 
Use Policy, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 381, 385–86 (2002). 
11. See THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET 2018 BUDGET: INFRASTRUCTURE 
INITIATIVE (2018), https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/fact_sheets/2018%
20Budget%20Fact%20Sheet_Infrastructure%20Initiative.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EBZ5-FHWH]; see Salkin, supra note 10, at 382; see generally 
Smart Growth, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth [https://perma.cc/UC8L-
QYB7] (noting different programs and benefits surrounding Smart Growth 
initiatives) [hereinafter Smart Growth]. 
3
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Although subsequent political and economic events decreased 
the likelihood of comprehensive infrastructure legislation,12 
executive and administrative actions have already reduced or 
eliminated federal funding for infrastructure projects.13 
Regardless of whether the federal government takes legislative 
action, the nation’s infrastructure continues to age and continues 
to threaten environmental, economic, and physical harm to the 
public.14 The responsibility to fund public infrastructure projects 
will likely continue to fall on cash-strapped states. Therefore, 
states and municipalities will need to enter into P3 agreements in 
order to fund infrastructure development, while also considering 
necessary protections to the public’s environmental and economic 
interests from risks associated with such agreements. 
Inspired by the Plan’s infrastructure policy, this Note 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of modern P3 agreements 
used for public infrastructure projects, and legislative options 
states have to support P3 use for the protection of the public’s 
environmental and economic interests. Tools like P3 and Smart 
Growth legislation help states prepare for the management of 
 
12. See David Shepardson, Republicans, Democrats Fight Over 
Infrastructure Plans, REUTERS (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-infrastructure/republicans-democrats-fight-over-infrastructure-plans-
idUSKBN1FS3CU [https://perma.cc/J9AE-F2YB] (revealing how passage of 
infrastructure legislation quickly became subject to political disputes and 
partisan politics); see also Mike DeBonis, Democrats to Unveil $1 Trillion 
Infrastructure Plan, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/democrats-to-unveil-1-trillion-
infrastructure-plan-seek-reversal-of-gop-tax-cuts-to-
finceit/2018/03/07/0de718f621c811e894daebf9d112159c_story.html?utm_term=.c
794c98444a3 [https://perma.cc/UNQ6-WQPD]; see also Ryan Mallory Shelbourne, 
Infrastructure Plan will Come in ‘Five or Six Different Bills’, THE HILL (Mar. 8, 
2018), https://thehill.com/policy/transportation/infrastructure/377472-ryan-
infrastructure-plan-will-come-in-5-or-6-different [https://perma.cc/XRS5-LBSF]; 
see also Michael Sargent & Anthony Kim, Steel & Aluminum Tariffs a Big Threat 
to Trump’s Infrastructure Plan, THE HILL (Mar. 9, 2018), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/377553-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-a-
big-threat-to-trumps-infrastructure-plan [https://perma.cc/4ZZV-UGS6]. 
13. See Karen Yi, Feds Deal Major Blow to Gateway Tunnel Project, NJ.COM 
(Dec. 30, 2017), http://www 
.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2017/12/federal_funding_deal_for_gateway_tunnel_projec
t_no.html [https://perma.cc/36E8-U9NV]; see also Grace Guarnieri, Trump Halts 
$13 Billion Obama Amtrak Plan Despite Calls for Infrastructure Spending in 
2018, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 31, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-amtrak-
infrastructure-spending-766861 [https://perma.cc/AY9R-TCST]. 
14. See REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 5. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/6
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these often-competing positions. A review of the Plan and existing 
federal Smart Growth policy reveals how the Plan failed to 
integrate Smart Growth principles to address common weaknesses 
of P3 use, such as, limited public input, inappropriate projects, and 
projects that promote sprawl.15 
In order to facilitate infrastructure development that 
integrates both P3s and Smart Growth, states can incorporate 
Smart Growth policies into new or amended P3 legislation or adopt 
separate, but complementary, legislation. An analysis of a recent 
P3 agreement in Maryland provides further instruction on how P3 
and Smart Growth laws and policies interact with states and 
municipalities. This interaction can protect the public’s 
environmental and economic interests to the greatest extent 
possible when forming P3 agreements. Further, these tools may be 
implemented regardless of whether federal infrastructure 
development legislation is successful or current federal Smart 
Growth policy continues. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF AMERICAN 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
 The United States’ most visible infrastructure systems are 
arguably the nation’s 4 million miles of streets, roads, and 
highways.16 Vehicle-miles traveled hit a record high in 2016, when 
people and goods moved over 3.2 trillion miles.17 Unsurprisingly, 
the most cited effect of inadequate maintenance and backlogged 
rehabilitation to the nation’s roadways are congestion and traffic 
delays.18 Increased traffic congestion causes road conditions to 
disintegrate faster, and poor road conditions increase automobile 
 
15. See THE PLAN, supra note 7, at 3–4 (promoting sprawl by highlighting 
new development and rural expansion while allocating zero funds to the 
maintenance and repair of urban-transit’s existing physical infrastructure); see 
also Matti Siemiatycki & Naeem Farooqi, Value for Money and Risk in Public–
Private Partnerships, 78 J. OF THE AM. PLAN. ASS’N 286, 288 (2012) (identifying 
common shortcomings of P3); see also Deborah Ballati & Richard 
Robinson, Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons Learned and Predictions for the 
Future, 34 CONSTR. L. 27, 32-33 (2014). 
16. REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 76.   
17. Id.  
18. See id. 
5
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accident rates.19 In 2017, 40% of all urban interstate highways 
were congested, and 20% of highway pavement was in poor 
condition.20 The American Society of Civil Engineers (“ASCE”) 
reported that, “[a]fter years of decline, traffic fatalities increased 
by 7% from 2014 to 2015 . . . .”21 
Road infrastructure quality directly impacts the national 
economy. In 2014, poor road conditions caused traffic, which used 
3.1 billion gallons of fuel, and delayed Americans by 6.9 billion 
hours, amounting to $160 billion in wasted time.22 The ASCE 
directly correlates insufficient investment in infrastructure 
maintenance to broad, negative economic impacts.23 The ASCE 
found that aging infrastructure causes every American household 
to lose $3,400 annually.24 By 2025, the ASCE predicts that 
infrastructure underperformance will cost the United States $3.9 
trillion in gross domestic product (“GDP”), $7 trillion in business 
sales, and 2.5 million jobs.25 
Discussions about maintenance, repair, or replacement of 
existing roads and highways should concurrently consider the 
conditions and availability of transit systems.26 The earliest 
domestic transit systems, constructed in the late-1800s, were 
privately owned.27 As the automobile decreased transit’s profit 
 
19. See id.; see also Rajeev Kumar et al., Smart Management of Heavy Traffic 
Urban Roads, 04 INT’L RES. J. OF ENGINEERING & TECH. 840, 841 (2017) 
(“[P]avement that can last for 10 years without overloading will last only for 6.5 
years, if there is 10 percent overloading on an average. With 30 percent 
overloading, the same pavement will last only for 3.5 years. The situation has led 
to swift rate of deterioration. . .”). 
20. REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 76; see also U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. 
HIGHWAY ADMIN. & FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2015 STATUS OF 
THE NATION’S HIGHWAYS, BRIDGES, AND TRANSIT: CONDITIONS AND PERFORMANCE, 
at 5–3 (2015), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/2015cpr 
/pdfs/2015cpr.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4EQ-CGNX] (defining “Congestion, which 
can be recurring or nonrecurring, occurs when traffic demand approaches or 
exceeds the available capacity of the system.”) [hereinafter HIGHWAYS, BRIDGES, 
AND TRANSIT]. 
21. REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 76.  
22. Id. at 76.  
23. FAILURE TO ACT, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
24. REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 7.  
25. Id. (citing FAILURE TO ACT, supra note 4, at 7).  
26. See REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 88. Existing roadway maintenance is 
important for public transit because bus riders make up half of transit passenger. 
See id.  
27. HIGHWAYS, BRIDGES, AND TRANSIT, supra note 20, at 2–21. 
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margins post-World War II, governments recognized the 
importance of facilitating sustained transit services.28 However, 
transit’s physical infrastructure (e.g., tracks and signals) currently 
represents some of the worst infrastructure conditions nationally. 
Thirty-five percent of guideway elements like tracks and 37% of 
stations reported by the ASCE are “not in a ‘state of good repair.’”29 
Transit systems nationwide face a $90 billion rehabilitation 
backlog.30 These shortcomings pose severe risks to public safety 
and harm public perception of transit’s dependability.31 Although 
new lines are added annually, only 11% of Americans take public 
transportation at least once a week.32 This suggests that those who 
cannot access transit must instead rely on automobiles for non-
walkable or non-bikeable distances. Without immediate and 
continued investment, Americans will not be enticed to increase 
their use of public-transit, an outcome that would help relieve the 
burden on America’s roads.33 
Despite the clear and imminent risks, deep funding shortages 
persist.34 State and municipal governments struggle to secure the 
funds for “maintaining or rebuilding existing infrastructure that 
currently needs repair or replacement,” as well as, “building new 
infrastructure to service an increasing population that will reach 
380 million by 2040, and the expanded economic activity and 
infrastructure use resulting from this growth and added 
 
28. Id.; see also REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 88 (highlighting how even 
today, the nation’s transit lines continue to grow, providing 10.5 billion trips in 
2015, or a 33% increase over 20 years). 
29. REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 89.  
30. Id. at 90.  
31. See id. at 91; see also Jonathan English, Why Did America Give Up on 
Mass Transit? (Don’t Blame Cars.), CITYLAB (Aug. 31, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/08/how-america-killed-
transit/568825/ [https://perma.cc/79MG-4WDJ]. 
32. REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 88–89 (also noting 49% of American 
households remain unable to access public transit to complete basic tasks).  
33. See Michael L. Anderson, Subways, Strikes, and Slowdowns: The 
Impacts of Public Transit on Traffic Congestion, SEMANTIC SCHOLAR 1, 2 (2013), 
https://are.berkeley.edu/~mlanderson/pdf/Anderson_transit.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/24ZB-C7T9] (finding an abrupt increase in average road-traffic 
delays of 47% when Los Angeles transit services ceased). 
34. REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 7 (“[T]he U.S. has only been paying half of 
its infrastructure bill for some time and failing to close that gap risks rising costs, 
falling business productivity, plummeting GDP, lost jobs, and ultimately, reduced 
disposable income for every American family.”). 
7
  
218 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
demands.”35 The Plan offers one approach, a heavy reliance on the 
creation of P3 agreements.36 Though necessary to secure funding, 
P3s often limit public input and are not appropriate for every 
infrastructure project.37 Passage of comprehensive P3 legislation 
at the state level could proactively reduce the risk of harm to the 
public from inappropriate or unsuccessful agreements. 
III. A HISTORY IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS 
A.   Full-Privatization with Limited Government 
Oversight 
History provides insight into the concerns associated with 
private investment in public infrastructure. Before the twentieth-
century, the private sector exercised sizeable control over the 
infrastructure development process, ranging from project design to 
finance and operations.38 This era produced many major 
infrastructure advancements, but full-privatization produced 
“poor safety records, . . . labor abuses, corrupt business practices, 
and unequal distribution of services.”39 The balance of 
responsibility for infrastructure development, and maintenance 
shifted from the private-sector to the public-sector by the mid-
1900s, as the federal government recognized “high-quality public 
infrastructure” as an important public-interest concern.40 
B.   Government Controlled Design-Bid-Build 
Approach 
From the 1950s until the late 1970s, the public design-bid-
build (“DBB”) approach to infrastructure development created 
 
35. FAILURE TO ACT, supra note 4, at 2.  
36. See THE PLAN, supra note 7. 
37. See Siemiatycki & Farooqi, supra note 15, at 288; see also Ballati & 
Robinson, supra note 15, at 32–33.  
38. Matti Siemiatycki, The Global Experience with Infrastructure Public-
Private Partnerships, 64 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 6, 6 (2012) (acknowledging that 
private entities were subject to limited government approval and monitoring).   
39. Id. at 7.  
40. Id.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/6
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“‘the Golden Age’ of infrastructure.’”41 Under the public DBB 
model, government agencies designed projects in-house in 
consultation with private engineers or planners.42 The government 
then completed a competitive bidding process to choose a private 
builder able to complete the project to the government’s 
specifications.43 Under this approach, the public sector considers 
its own criteria to prioritize investment and finances construction 
through government debt or bonds.44 Rather than imposing new 
user fees on the public, these funds are repaid via general 
government revenues.45 
However, the DBB approach possessed shortcomings. Matti 
Siemiatycki46 describes how the public sector’s involvement at 
different project stages created a “highly disaggregated” 
structure.47 The public DBB model created multiple contractual-
partnerships between the government and  public firms, such as 
design, construction, and finance firms, which caused financial 
risks to fall on the public partner.48 Thus, infrastructure project 
design, construction, and operation, though publicly controlled, 
still struggled to protect the public’s economic interests.49 By the 
1970s, the public sector understood that large, critical 
infrastructure projects were often prone to “systematic cost 
overruns and construction delays, followed by poor service quality; 
construction not always of a high quality, leading to service 
outages or unavailability; and lower-than-expected financial 
returns, environmental amelioration, and social equity benefits.”50 
Fiscally-concerned political aversion towards public-sector debt 
soon limited the availability of public funds for infrastructure 
maintenance and expansion.51 
 
41. Id. (citing ALAN ALTSHULER & DAVID LUBEROFF, MEGA-PROJECTS: THE 
CHANGING POLITICS OF URBAN PUBLIC INVESTMENTS (Brookings Inst. ed., 2003)).  
42. Id. at 7.  
43. Id.  
44. Id.  
45. Id. 
46. Matti Siemiatycki, Associate Professor Profile, U. OF TORONTO, 
http://geography.utoronto.ca/profiles/matti-siemiatycki/ [https://perma.cc/AP9M-
7ZCX]. 
47. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 7. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
9
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C.   Strengths and Weaknesses of the Modern Public-
Private Partnership 
Prevailing rhetoric in the late 1970s focused on government’s 
general inefficiency and the public DBB method’s failure to support 
the competition needed “to spur innovation.”52 Across the world, 
governments sold off publicly-owned, significant infrastructure 
operations in bus, rail, freight transportation, and more.53 At the 
same time, federally-directed deregulation efforts sought to foster 
competition amongst new private-sector partners.54 The mixed 
outcomes of the resurgence in privatization, as well as ideological 
disputes over privatization’s advantages, led many nations to halt 
plans for wholesale privatization.55 These debates revealed the 
need for a new model to successfully integrate the relative 
strengths of both public and private-sector participants into 
infrastructure agreements.56 
The contemporary P3 emerged from government 
experimentation since the 1980s with private-sector involvement 
in the different stages of public-infrastructure projects.57 
Siemiatycki describes three basic characteristics of contemporary 
P3s: (1) the project provides both partners with some mutual 
benefit; (2) the private sector makes some contractual concession 
for a mix of design, construction, funding, and future operations; 
and (3) the project risks are conveyed to the partner most equipped 
to handle them.58 The National Council for Public-Private 
Partnerships (“NCPPP”)59 prescribes that all P3s require a 
contractual agreement between a public agency and a private 
 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 7.  
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id.  
57. Id. (P3 agreements can involve the private sector in one or multiple 
stages, including “design, construction, financing, [future] operation, and 
maintenance”). 
58. Id. 
59. See About, NAT’L COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, 
https://ncppp.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/LS4U-F4SK] (“[The National Council 
for Public-Private Partnership’s mission is to] advocate and facilitate the 
formation of public-private partnerships at the federal, state and local levels, 
where appropriate, and to raise the awareness of governments and businesses of 
the means by which their cooperation can cost effectively provide the public with 
quality goods, services and facilities.”). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/6
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entity to share in the delivery of a service or facility for the general 
public’s use.60 This model excludes the public DBB approach that 
seldom involved “private financing upon which meaningful risk 
transfer [was] predicated,” and simultaneously prevents outright 
privatization (e.g., free enterprises governed through regulation 
and controlled by the private sector in perpetuity).61 
Experts consider “‘public-private partnership’. . .an umbrella 
term that encompasses a wide array of agreements whereby 
governments contract with private entities for the provision or 
delivery of facilities or services to the public.”62 Models of P3 
transactions include Build-Own-Operate,63 Design-Build-
Operate,64 Operate-Maintain-Manage,65 Design-Build-Finance,66 
and the “full-fledged P3” referred to as Design-Build-Finance-
Operate-Maintain.67 Another commonly used model, the 
concession contract, requires the public partner to concede some 
physical infrastructure (e.g., a toll road or bridge) to a private-
partner for a certain number of years in return for a single and 
 
60. See The National Council for Public-Private Partnerships - 7 Keys to 
Success, INFORMED CYNIC, http://www.informedcynic.com/P3/P3-
reports/2015%20-NCPPP-7-points-to-successc.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX5Z-XF9R]. 
61. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 7. 
62. Kelsey Hogan, Protecting the Public in Public-Private Partnerships: 
Strategies for Ensuring Adaptability in Concession Contracts, 2014 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 420, 425 (2014) (citing John Ziegler, Note, The Dangers of Municipal 
Concession Contracts: A New Vehicle to Improve Accountability and 
Transparency, 60 PUB. CONT. L.J. 571, 574 (2011)).  
63. Id. at 425–26 (“where a private contractor builds and operates a facility 
for public use or for the purpose of providing a public good, without ever 
transferring ownership to the government or public sector”).  
64. Id. at 426 (“whereby the government awards a single contract to a private 
firm for the design, construction, and operation of a capital improvement project, 
but the title to the facility remains with the public sector”).  
65. Id. (“[W]here the government contracts with a private partner to operate, 
maintain, and manage an existing facility or service.”).  
66. Rebecca C. Lewis, New York’s Plodding Pace on P3s, CITY & ST. N.Y. 
(Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/policy/infrastructure/new-yorks-
plodding-pace-p3s.html [https://perma.cc/WD85-2R5M] (describing a model that 
integrates private funding into the publicly controlled design-bid-build model).  
67. Id. (“[T]he private company . . . designs and builds the project, . . . 
partially finances it, then maintains and operates it for an agreed upon number 
of years. This takes . . . risk off the state while providing a better end product 
more quickly that the private company could also better maintain.”). 
11
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significant up-front payment.68 The private-partner recovers the 
cost of the upfront payment through collection of user fees (e.g., 
tolls or fares) during the concession period.69 The operation and 
maintenance of the infrastructure typically becomes the private-
partner’s responsibility.70 Thus, a central benefit of P3 use for 
public entities is the transfer of risk onto the private partners. 
State P3 legislation should aim to ensure that contractual P3 
agreements are structured so that risks and rewards are shared 
fairly between both parties via contractually dictated 
requirements for each stage of the project.71 Integration of Smart 
Growth’s public-interest supportive principles into state P3 
legislation and individual P3 agreements could help ensure well-
structured P3s for public-infrastructure. 
Despite concerns associated with private investment in public 
infrastructure, another key strength of P3s is it approaches 
bipartisan reception at the federal and state levels.72 Prior to the 
release of the Plan, the Obama Administration undertook 
initiatives to explore the use of P3s to fund the nation’s 
infrastructure needs.73 Lawmakers interested in P3s, including 
members of the bipartisan Congressional Caucus on Public Private 
Partnerships (“Congressional P3 Caucus”), sought to understand 
the benefits and challenges with P3 use for public-infrastructure 
projects.74  The federal Department of Transportation (“DOT”) and 
Treasury Department subsequently hosted a summit on 
September 14, 2014, to gather recommendations on P3s.75 In 
 
68. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 8 (describing a typical concession period 
that ranges between 25 and 99 years).  
69. Id.; see also Hogan, supra note 62, at 426. 
70. Hogan, supra note 62, at 426; Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 8.  
71. Hogan, supra note 62, at 451–52 (discussing the importance of 
negotiating the concession agreement’s terms in response to public demands); 
Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 8.  
72. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 6 (“[P3s] have been widely accepted across 
partisan political lines [and] in the United States, both Democrat- and 
Republican-controlled states have experimented with [P3s].”); see also Public-
Private Partnerships May be Key to Unlock Doors to Potential Investors and 
Project Opportunities, 38 CONSTR. CONTR. L. REP. 1, Nov. 7, 2014, at ¶ 242 
(discussing the Obama Administration’s support of P3s for infrastructure 
projects) [hereinafter Key to Unlock Potential Investors]. 
73. Key to Unlock Potential Investors, supra note 72.   
74. Id.  
75. Id.  
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response to the finding that a “lack of unity in P3 enabling laws at 
the federal and state level inhibited the use of P3s,”76 the 
Bipartisan Policy Center (“BPC”) published the P3 Model State 
Legislation (“P3 Model Law”).77 Based on an examination of P3 
best practices nationwide, the four key components of the BPC’s P3 
Model Law seek to: (1) enable P3 use in a variety of wide-ranging 
projects, (2) create a state office dedicated to providing P3 expertise 
and assistance, (3) standardize and promote best practices, and (4) 
protect the public interest.78 
Most states have embraced the P3 model in exchange for the 
promise of lower costs and faster project completion times.79 
Through a mixture of legislative and regulatory actions, thirty-six 
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, have authorized 
some degree of P3 use for the development of public 
infrastructure.80 The value attributed to P3 models derives from 
“the belief that governments and firms working in meaningful 
collaboration will deliver major infrastructure projects that have 
better outcomes than any one party could deliver on their own.”81 
For state and local municipal governments with limited funding 
sources, the P3 structure shifts the financial burden from 
 
76. Id.  
77. BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (P3) MODEL STATE 
LEGISLATION, (Dec. 2015), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/BPC-P3-Enabling-Model-Legislation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U827-9XRD] [hereinafter P3 MODEL LAW]; see also Model Law 
Gives Template for State P3 Legislation, NAT’L COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS, https://ncppp.org/model-law-gives-template-for-state-p3-
legislation/ [https://perma.cc/E5GZ-FVHS]. 
78. P3 MODEL LAW, supra note 77, at 3.  
79. Key to Unlock Potential Investors, supra note 72; see also Siemiatycki, 
supra note 38, at 9 (citing ALLEN CONSULTING GROUP, FINAL REPORT: 
PERFORMANCE OF P3S AND TRADITIONAL PROCUREMENT IN AUSTRALIA (2007), 
https://www.irfnet.ch/files-
upload/knowledges/IPA_Performance%20of%20PPPs_2007.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UCV5-2JJ8] (“With a significant number of [P3s] now completed 
and in operation, there is emerging evidence that [P3s] do in fact have a better 
record than traditional design-bid-build projects at delivering infrastructure on 
time and on budget.”)).  
80. See U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., State P3 Legislation, CTR. 
FOR INNOVATIVE FINANCE SUPPORT, https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/p3/legislation/ 
[https://perma.cc/3LYQ-5AHA] [hereinafter State P3 Legislation].  
81. Siemiatycki & Farooqi, supra note 15, at 287.  
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immediate, upfront costs to periodic payments, later payments, or 
onto the public through use fees.82 
Despite this widespread support, certain concerns are 
intrinsic to P3 use in public-infrastructure projects. While 
supporters of P3 agreements claim these models reduce costs, 
there are doubts about the transfer of financial risk and other 
financial benefits to the public partner. When a P3 agreement 
involves the repayment of some or all of a private partner’s 
concession payment through scheduled payments from the public 
partner, the government becomes subject to substantially higher 
interest rates than those applied to standard government 
borrowing.83 Furthermore, P3s may also result in higher base costs 
than projects delivered through public-procurement because, “the 
private-sector partner charges a premium for bundling various 
design and construction functions into a single concession and 
taking on greater risk.”84 Third, when investors recover their 
initial investments through user fees, concerns arise about 
investors that capture excessive profits.85 In such agreements, the 
private partner assumes the project’s revenue risk and public-
partners regularly lose control over fee rates, service coordination, 
and integration of the project into the wider network—all to the 
detriment of public users.86 When repayment depends on tolls and 
user fees, disputes between a private-partner and a future 
government over an agreement made by the preceding government 
regarding user fee rates, service quality, and public desires to 
upgrade contractually-conceded infrastructure are common.87 
Another common concern with P3 use is limited public input. 
Commercial confidentiality requirements, a private partner’s 
desire to limit costs, and the contracting government’s possible 
interest in capitalizing on a one-time concession payment can 
collectively limit meaningful public input in contract formation 
and project development.88 Limitation of public involvement at 
 
82. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 8.  
83. Id. at 9 (“This amounts to an additional $20 to $40 million in financing 
costs for every $100 million that the private-sector partner borrows over a 35-year 
concession period.”).  
84. Id. 
85. Id.  
86. Id. at 10. 
87. Id.  
88. Siemiatycki & Farooqi, supra note 15, at 288.  
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conceptualization, planning, and approval stages creates 
transparency and accountability issues and risks the development 
of infrastructure that fails to meet public needs.89 The public’s 
social, economic, and environmental interests in infrastructure 
development are great and varied.90 Infrastructure projects, which 
consider how best to meet public needs from early development 
stages, are more likely to succeed at producing successful 
infrastructure that provide adequate financial returns.91 The 
possible influence of public input on a project’s success supports 
the need for state P3 legislation that seeks to ensure early public 
involvement and consultation in project development.92 
Critics further worry that contractual P3 agreements lack 
flexibility and create unstable partnerships.93 Siemiatycki states 
that, “a common critique of [P3s] has been . . . the risk of present 
decision makers locking in the policy options of future 
governments[,]” stifling future project innovation by making “it 
difficult or costly for governments to retrofit infrastructure . . . 
over time to meet changing conditions, public demands, or evolving 
policy objectives.”94 If key risks are not properly divided between 
the public and private partners and possible circumstantial 
changes are not provided for in the agreement, an unstable 
partnership may occur and require expensive contract 
renegotiations or a cancelation at the public’s expense.95 Examples 
 
89. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 9.  
90. Robert Puentes, Why Infrastructure Matters: Rotten Roads, Bum 
Economy, BROOKINGS (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/why-
infrastructure-matters-rotten-roads-bum-economy/ [https://perma.cc/Q8LF-
RNCH]; see Richard Threlfall, The Importance of Infrastructure Investment, BBC 
NEWS (Oct. 29, 2010), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-11642433 
[https://perma.cc/5F5T-BFE3].  
91. See Hogan, supra note 62, at 452 (“The more responsive the government 
is to the public before a [P3] is signed, the less they will have to undertake costly 
renegotiation or similar measures after[wards].”). 
92. See Chasity H. O’Steen & John R. Jenkins, We Built it, and They Came! 
Now What? Public-Private Partnerships in the Replacement Era, 41 STETSON L. 
REV. 249, 287–99 (2012) (reviewing how to counteract common contract issue in 
P3 agreements, including the private-partner’s nonperformance and the public-
partners desire to undertake repairs not contractually provided for). 
93. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 11; Siemiatycki & Farooqi, supra note 15, 
at 288.  
94. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 10. 
95. Id. (highlighting the failed P3 agreement for the State Route 91 express 
toll lane project in Orange County, California, where financial or performance 
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exist where private-sector partners have sued to renegotiate after 
a project failed to generate expected profit and forced the public-
partner into a buy-out before the end of the contractual concession 
period.96 Such occurrences have raised questions about whether 
the public-partner actually remains the ultimate risk holders 
under the P3 model.97 Successful P3 legislation would require P3 
agreements to establish explicit policies for renegotiation in case of 
future changes in circumstances to ensure the flexibility of public-
policy throughout the P3 concession period.98 
A fourth major concern in the formation of P3 agreements is 
the appropriateness of the P3 model for a given project. A review 
of the worldwide experience with P3s revealed that “public and 
private entities must evaluate projects on a case-by-case basis to 
determine whether a public-private partnership arrangement will 
benefit both parties and the community in meeting infrastructure 
needs.”99 One of the most common and sizeable mistakes made at 
the onset of a P3 project is the choice to use P3s on the wrong type 
of project.100 Arguably, the most recognized major infrastructure 
developed through government agreements with private 
companies are toll highways.101 Toll highways allow private 
investors to recoup their investments through high use fees.102 
Infrastructure projects that present the opportunity for private 
partners to charge user fees and apply them towards repayment of 
the private investments are therefore more appropriate than 
projects that charge the public additional use fees for use of 
necessary infrastructure, which goes against the public’s 
 
challenges forced the public partner to buy out or take over the private partner’s 
obligations); see Siemiatycki & Farooqi, supra note 15, at 288; see also O’Steen & 
Jenkins, supra note 92, at 302 (describing a successful P3 partnership as a 
thoughtfully-constructed business plan that clearly establishes the partners’ 
different responsibilities and provides a process for dispute resolution in case of 
unexpected challenges).  
96. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 10. 
97. Id.  
98. Siemiatycki & Farooqi, supra note 15, at 288; see also Siemiatycki, supra 
note 38, at 10. 
99. O’Steen & Jenkins, supra note 92, at 302. 
100. Ballati & Robinson, supra note 15, at 32.  
101. Id. at 31.  
102. Id. at 30.  
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interest.103 Since delivery of an infrastructure project through a P3 
approach requires significant technical and legal input that creates 
high transaction costs, prospective partners should determine 
early in the process whether the size and scope of the project 
justifies these costs.104 
No one-size-fits-all private funding model works for every 
infrastructure project.105 Even when the P3 structure is 
appropriate for a given project, success will likely only be achieved 
if both parties establish practical hopes and expectations.106 
Rationally, another element in successful P3 partnerships is the 
government’s selection of a private-sector partner with the best 
“value” for the project. In this context, value means the private-
partner’s long-term ability to fulfill contractual duties and 
obligations under the P3 agreement, not just the private entity 
that offers the “lowest bid” to complete the project.107 Some experts 
suggest that a P3 project will most likely succeed if both partners 
are willing to invest in extensive legal representation and 
consultations prior to reaching a concession agreement.108 Thus, 
P3s are considered neither “a panacea nor an inescapable recipe 
for disaster.”109 Their success turns instead on the thoughtful 
handling of the project’s specific circumstances in the formation of 
the agreement to ensure a fair outcome for both partners.110 
A persistent unfamiliarity with P3 models amongst municipal 
governments poses a final obstacle to successful implementation of 
P3 models in public-infrastructure projects. Among Sabol & 
 
103. See Key to Unlock Potential Investors, supra note 73 (citing David 
Tanner, DOT Appointee Foxx Downplays Tolling Funding Solution, LAND LINE 
MAG. (May 22, 2013), https://www.texasturf.org/2012-06-01-03-09-30/latest-
news/public-private-partnerships/351-foxx-downplays-tolling-but-fan-of-p3s 
[https://perma.cc/5NDK-FQ6V] (“DOT Secretary Anthony Foxx said he was in 
favor of using P3s, but that interstate tolling should only be used to add new 
capacity to the highway system and should not be viewed as a complete solution 
to the Highway Trust Fund shortfalls.”).  
104. See Ballati & Robinson, supra note 15, at 33 (offering best practices 
stakeholders can use to avoid this problem); see also Key to Unlock Potential 
Investors, supra note 72.   
105. O’Steen & Jenkins, supra note 92, at 302. 
106. Id. at 303. 
107. Id.  
108. Ballati & Robinson, supra note 15, at 32–33.  
109. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 6.   
110. Id.   
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Puentes’ nine P3 recommendations to public leaders is their advice 
to assemble a competent and skilled public-sector team able to 
create and carry-out informed procurement decisions while 
entering into P3 agreements.111 Two elements considered common 
in successful P3 partnerships are: (1) the existence of public-sector 
commitment to the P3 approach at all levels of government to 
promote “a stable, predictable, and reliable procurement process”; 
and (2) active and consistent public-sector involvement in the 
partnership, including monitoring of the private-sector partner’s 
performance through some form of benchmarking and specified 
evaluation methodology.112 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
responsibility to fulfill these roles and produce “official reports that 
evaluate the merits of using [P3] procurement for a given project,” 
often falls on local government planning, engineering, and legal 
departments.113 
The recent surge of interest in modern P3 models throughout 
the United States has not yet resulted in comprehensive “public 
sector understanding of the [P3] landscape.”114 Untrained and 
underprepared municipal staff are much more likely to fail to 
protect public interests in the formation, implementation, and 
operations of P3 infrastructure projects. In 2012, Siemiatycki 
reported that local municipal planners, lawyers, and professionals, 
less experienced with major P3 deals in infrastructure projects, 
were underprepared when first engaging with P3 deals.115 
Although P3 guidance materials produced through bipartisan 
federal and state action have encouraged states to enact P3 
legislation and regulations, a quarter of states have yet to 
implement P3 enabling statutes.116 Moreover, not all existing 
statutes direct state agencies to educate and train municipal 
 
111. See Patrick Sabol & Robert Puentes, Private Capital, Public Good: 
Drivers of Successful Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships, BROOKINGS (Dec. 
17, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/research/private-capital-public-good-
drivers-of-successful-infrastructure-public-private-partnerships/ 
[https://perma.cc/L3ZM-UMMW]. 
112. O’Steen & Jenkins, supra note 92, at 302. 
113. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 6. 
114. Sabol & Puentes, supra note 111. 
115. Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 6.  
116. See generally State P3 Legislation, supra note 80 (inferring that 
fourteen of fifty states, or 27%, lack P3 enabling statutes). 
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governments to undertake contractual negotiations for P3 
agreements to fund infrastructure projects.117 
In consideration of these shortcomings, comprehensive state-
level legislation should seek to minimize financial risks to the 
public-partner posed by high interest rates and potential loss of 
control over fee rates and service quality. Legislation should also 
actively facilitate public input and consultation in P3 agreement 
formation (possibly through the integration of Smart Growth 
policy) and aid governments in their determination of the 
appropriateness of a given project for a P3 model. Lastly, 
legislation should provide for agreement renegotiation procedures 
in the event of unforeseen or unfavorable outcomes and facilitate 
the production of guidance materials from state agencies for local 
and regional governments to increase municipal familiarity with 
P3 formation, implementation, and operations. 
IV. FEDERAL INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY 
A. The 2018 Infrastructure Plan and Federal Smart 
Growth Policy 
Before considering the lessons learned from existing state 
legislation, this Note will explore how The Plan fails to extend 
federal support for Smart Growth infrastructure development. The 
Plan presents a particular image for the future of the nation’s 
infrastructure. This image seems to present two messages: (1) that 
state and municipal governments should shoulder more 
responsibility for infrastructure projects and fill the void left by 
prior federal funds through P3 contracts with private firms, and 
(2) federal funds should prioritize rural infrastructure, with the 
Plan explicitly allocating “$50 billion in no-string-attached 
spending for communities smaller than 50,000.”118 The Plan, based 
 
117. Id. 
118. Aarian Marshall, Trump’s Infrastructure Plan Threatens to Leave Little 
Cities Behind, WIRED (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/trump-
infrastructure-plan-leave-little-cities/ [https://perma.cc/T4GX-E7DF] 
 (“allocating just $100 billion in match funds over 10 years for infrastructure 
projects for the whole country”); see THE PLAN, supra note 7, at 3-5; see also 
Elizabeth McNichol, It’s Time for States to Invest in Infrastructure, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-
tax/its-time-for-states-to-invest-in-infrastructure [https://perma.cc/M7EE-ZG7T]. 
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on its core beliefs, not only fails to address known risks of  P3 
agreements to government entities, but it presents a policy that 
would actively promote sprawl development, automobile 
dependency, and the further allocation of funds away from critical 
urban infrastructure. In doing so, The Plan ignores recent federal 
Smart Growth policy. 
A central element of the Plan, the proposed Rural 
Infrastructure Program (“R.I.P.”), seeks to “provide for significant 
investment in rural infrastructure to address long-unmet needs. . .  
[and] spur prosperous rural economies,” and incentivize states to 
“partner with local and private investments for completion and 
operation of rural infrastructure projects.”119 Specifically, the Plan 
allocates $50 billion to the R.I.P to “expand access to markets, 
customers, and employment opportunities with projects that 
sustain and grow business revenue and personal income for rural 
Americans.”120 However, the Plan makes no separate allocation for 
the maintenance and repair of high-risk urban infrastructure.121 
This type of policy will certainly channel infrastructure funds 
towards new development and away from existing urban 
infrastructure, exacerbating existing issues with urban transit 
systems. 
The Plan’s emphasis on private funding and rural 
infrastructure expansion suggests that possible negative aspects of 
P3 infrastructure projects, including limited public input, the 
inappropriateness of P3 use for certain projects, and the promotion 
of and sprawl development, were inadequately considered. P3 
legislation that integrates Smart Growth principles would consider 
these economic concerns. Explicit integration of Smart Growth 
review into state P3 enabling legislation, or the passage of 
separate-but-supporting laws, will aid states and municipalities in 
protecting public-interests, both environmental and economic, 
when undertaking development projects via a P3 agreement. 
 
119. THE PLAN, supra note 7, at 5. 
120. Id. at 6. 
121. See generally THE PLAN, supra note 7 (failing to make any specific 
allocation for federal funds besides those for rural communities with populations 
under 50,000). 
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B.   Recent Federal Support for Smart Growth Policy 
Land use and development policies are traditionally viewed 
within the exclusive purview of states and localities.122 Since the 
early 2000s, state and local governments have adopted different 
aspects of Smart Growth policy.123 However, many state and local 
infrastructure projects have been partially funded through federal 
grants or supported by non-monetary programs.124 Through these 
programs, federal agencies have supported state-level Smart 
Growth approaches to development and a de facto national land 
use policy emerged in the early 1990s.125 
The Obama Administration was the first to coordinate federal 
administrative policy on housing, transportation, and the 
environment to support Smart Growth implementation at all 
levels.126 For the first time, the Department of Housing and Urban 
 
122. Salkin, supra note 10, at 381–82 nn.1, 2 (listing state executive orders). 
123. Id.; see, e.g., Ed Bolen et al., Smart Growth: A Review of Program State 
by State, 8 HASTINGS WEST NORTHWEST J. OF ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 145 (2001) 
(specifically examining California’s adoption of Smart Growth policies at the state 
and local level). 
124. See EPA, PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, FIVE YEARS OF 
LEARNING FROM COMMUNITIES AND COORDINATING FEDERAL INVESTMENTS 2, 5, 21 
(Aug. 2014), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-
08/documents/partnership-accomplishments-report-2014-reduced-size.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9MRQ-U9TH] [hereinafter FIVE YEARS OF LEARNING]; see HUD, 
CHOICE NEIGHBORHOODS PLANNING GRANTEE LIST 1–5 (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PIH/documents/CN_Planning_Grantees.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MMR8-NQM4] (listing communities and the portion of the 
cumulative $37,966,500 in CNP Grants each community received); see also HUD, 
CHOICE NEIGHBORHOODS IMPLEMENTATION GRANTEES, 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PIH/documents/Choice_Neighborhoods_Implem
entation_Grantees_List.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU3J-Z53K] (listing communities 
and the portion of the cumulative $862,235,211 in CNI Grants each community 
received); see also 2009-2017: Awarded Projects, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
https://www.transportation.gov/BUILDgrants/all-projects-map 
[https://perma.cc/G6KH-S4M4] (mapping out TIGER Grant recipients by year).  
125. See GREGORY K. INGRAM ET AL., SMART GROWTH POLICIES: AN 
EVALUATION OF PROGRAMS AND OUTCOMES, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND AND POLICY 
ix, 7 (Gregory K. Ingram et al. eds., 2009). 
126. HUD-DOT-EPA Partnership for Sustainable Communities, EPA, 
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/smartgrowth/hud-dot-epa-partnership-
sustainable-communities_.html [https://perma.cc/D5PB-4HML]; Elana Schor, 
Obama’s Partnership for Sustainable Communities will put the Feds’ Weight 
Behind Smart Growth, GRIST (Feb. 25, 2010), https://grist.org/article/2010-02-24-
obama-admin-wants-to-green-your-local-community/ [https://perma.cc/ZL22-
BCJY]. 
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Development (“HUD”), the DOT, and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”), worked together to allocate federal 
funds towards projects with inter-agency interests, including 
housing located in close proximity to transit and the development 
of infrastructure for transportation that helps reduce carbon 
emissions from automobiles.127 These actions arose from the desire 
to uniformly support sustainability at the federal level.128 The 
federal government also recognized that Smart Growth provided 
opportunities to reduce development and maintenance costs, while 
simultaneously creating new jobs in the process.129 
These federal agencies created inter-agency departments, 
initiatives, and grant programs.130 The EPA’s Smart Growth Unit 
became the Office of Sustainable Communities.131 HUD created 
the Office of Sustainable Housing and Communities to distribute 
grants, worth $140 million, to local Smart Growth endeavors.132 
The DOT increased investment in urban infrastructure for high-
speed, inter-city rail projects and coordinated with HUD to focus 
transit investment towards recipients of HUD investments.133 On 
June 16, 2009, all three agencies announced the formation of the 
Partnership for Sustainable Communities (“PSC”).134 The PSC 
program coordinated “federal housing, transportation, water, and 
other infrastructure investments,” in order “to make 
neighborhoods more prosperous, allow people to live closer to jobs, 
save households time and money, and reduce pollution.”135 Review 
of agency websites suggests that the PSC program is currently 
inactive. 
 
127. See Federal Smart Growth, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND & POL’Y (Feb. 6, 
2010), https://www.lincolninst.edu/news/lincoln-house-blog/federal-smart-growth 
[https://perma.cc/7K4L-HJYJ] [hereinafter Federal Smart Growth]. 
128. See id.; see also FIVE YEARS OF LEARNING, supra note 124, at 6. 
129. FIVE YEARS OF LEARNING, supra note 124, at 12.  
130. See National Archives, Federal Permitting Improvement Steering 
Council, FEDERAL REGISTER, https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-
permitting-improvement-steering-council, [https://perma.cc/EH6S-NJJ4]. 
131. Federal Smart Growth, supra note 125. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. FIVE YEARS OF LEARNING, supra note 124, at i.  
135. Sustainable Communities Resource Center, HUD, 
https://archives.huduser.gov/scrc/sustainability/partnership.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZC29-U243]. 
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Federal grant programs have been central to federal support 
of Smart Growth. Recent inter-agency grant programs included 
Capacity Building for Sustainable Communities (“CBSC”) and 
Sustainable Communities Regional Planning (“SCRP”).136 The 
CBSC provided grants to regional and local planning projects that 
incorporated housing and transportation concerns, and improved 
the ability for land use and zoning regulations, allowing for 
private-investments to support sustainable communities.137 The 
DOT and EPA issued SCRP grants to support urban and inter-
municipal planning efforts that “consider  challenges of economics, 
energy use, public health, and the environment.”138 However, both 
are listed as inactive in HUD’s 2017 Major Mortgage, Grant, 
Assistance, and Regulatory Programs report.139 Additional non-
monetary programs have rewarded communities for Smart Growth 
achievements. In 2002, the EPA first presented the National 
Award for Smart Growth Achievement (“NASGA”).140 NASGA 
“recognize[d] and support[ed] communities that use[d] innovative 
policies and strategies to strengthen their economies, provide[d] 
housing and transportation choices, develop[ed] in ways that 
[brought] benefits to a wide range of residents, and protect[ed] the 
environment.”141 The EPA no longer presents the NASGA.142 
Despite the discontinuance of these grants and awards, the 
EPA still provides information about Smart Growth programs on 
its website.143 The DOT also continues to allocate grants towards 
 
136. U.S. DEP’T OF URBAN HOUS. & DEV., HUD PROGRAMS 2017: MAJOR 
MORTGAGE, GRANT, ASSISTANCE, AND REGULATORY PROGRAMS 103–04 (2017), 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Main/documents/HUDPrograms2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KV8D-STD2] [hereinafter HUD PROGRAMS 2017].   
137. Id. at 103.  
138. Id. at 104–05.  
139. Id. at 103–05. 
140. National Award for Smart Growth Achievement, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/national-award-smart-growth-achievement 
[https://perma.cc/4L64-JGPN] [hereinafter National Award]. 
141. Id. 
142. Id.  
143. Smart Growth, supra note 11; Regional, State, and Local Opportunities 
for Funding Smart Growth Projects, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/regional-state-and-local-opportunities-
funding-smart-growth-projects [https://perma.cc/9ZWN-NXN9]; see also Building 
Blocks for Sustainable Communities, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/building-blocks-sustainable-
communities#background [https://perma.cc/YY76-HHCJ].  
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capital transportation infrastructure development under the 
Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (“FAST”) Act.144 In 2015, 
the FAST Act extended the Transportation Infrastructure Finance 
and Innovation Act (“TIFIA”) Program, “which provided [f]ederal 
credit assistance to eligible surface transportation projects, 
including highway, transit, intercity passenger rail, [and] some 
types of freight rail False”145 The FAST Act “authorize[d] $305 
billion over fiscal years 2016 through 2020 for the Department’s 
highway, highway and motor vehicle safety, public transportation, 
motor carrier safety, hazardous materials safety, [and] rail 
[investment].”146 Projects may qualify for TIFIA credit assistance 
if the project costs are equal to or in excess of $50 million or is a 
qualifying project type with a lower cost threshold (e.g., transit-
oriented development, rural infrastructure, and local 
infrastructure projects).147 A recent project funded by a TIFIA 
grant that exemplifies Smart Growth principles, and infill 
development practices, is the Moynihan Train Hall in New York 
City.148 Thus suggesting that although the Plan lacked the 
influence of Smart Growth principles, federal support for Smart 
Growth policies still continues in some capacity. 
While federal policies and programs related to the 
environment and transportation affect infrastructure development 
 
144. 23 U.S.C. §§ 601–609 (2019).  
145. Id.; Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act or “FAST Act”: Fact 
Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY 
ADMIN., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/fastact/factsheets/tifiafs.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/LH85-PNHN] [hereinafter FAST Act Fact Sheet]. Further 
financial assistance came through secured loans, loan guarantees, and lines of 
credit to the states, Washington D.C., and Puerto Rico, municipalities, other 
public authorities, or “private entities undertaking projects sponsored by public 
authorities.” FAST Act Fact Sheet, supra note 145. 
146. Environmental Review Toolkit, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY 
ADMIN., 
https://www.environment.fhwa.dot.gov/legislation/authorizations/FASTact.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/CD9F-V6NY]. 
147. 23 U.S.C. §§ 601(a)(12)(E), 601(a)(5), 602(a)(5)(B)(iv) (2019); FAST Act 
Fact Sheet, supra note 145. 
148. Andrew Bender, Inside New York City’s Moynihan Train Hall: The 
Future of Penn Station, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewbender/2016/10/07/inside-new-york-citys-
moynihan-train-hall-the-future-of-penn-station/#5f9a388d2f8a. 
[https://perma.cc/HAA8-AVGB]; see also Moynihan Train Hall, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TRANSP. (2017), https://www.transportation.gov/tifia/financed-
projects/moynihan-train-hall [https://perma.cc/5GGX-KQEA]. 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/6
 2019] PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 235 
practices, the power to directly regulate development and make 
development decisions remains predominantly with state and local 
governments.149 Leaving these powers with the states is logical. 
The majority of infrastructure projects concern local and regional 
systems and the communities that they serve, which means state 
and local governments are best positioned to determine the 
projects to prioritize based on the needs and interests of the 
effected public. For example, of the almost 56,000 structurally 
deficient bridges across the country, only about 1,900, or 3.4%, are 
located on the Interstate Highway System.150 However, smaller-
scale, local projects are less appropriate for the P3 model than 
larger projects on interstate highways and transit-hubs.151 Thus, 
the shift in federal policy away from Smart Growth suggested, 
through the reduction in federal programs and lack of integration 
in the Plan, an increased need for state-sponsored Smart Growth 
legislation to counteract decreased federal participation. 
Integration of Smart Growth policies into state-level P3 legislation 
can help state and local governments ensure public input into P3 
agreement development, determine the appropriateness of a P3 
model for a given project, allow for the economic benefits of Smart 
Growth (discussed below), and help maintain the spread of Smart 
Growth development. 
C.   Why Smart Growth? How Smart Growth 
Addresses Disadvantages of P3 Use 
When entering into a P3 agreement, the public partner “must 
protect the public interest and safety while finding ways to finance 
infrastructure projects.”152 By supporting public input and 
minimizing future maintenance costs through limiting sprawl 
 
149. About Smart Growth, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/about-
smart-growth#smartgrowth [https://perma.cc/BWS4-WEFP] [hereinafter About 
Smart Growth]. 
150. Nearly 56,000 American Bridges on Structurally Deficient List, New 
Analysis of Federal Data Shows, AM. RD. & TRANSP. BUILDERS ASS’N, 
https://www.artba.org/2017/02/15/nearly-56000-american-bridges-on-
structurally-deficient-list-new-analysis-of-federal-data-shows/ 
[https://perma.cc/7QP6-HWYB]. 
151. Infrastructure that serves large interstate populations can more easily 
support the integration of additional user fees and offer private-partners better 
returns on investments than local or regional infrastructure. 
152. Key to Unlock Potential Investors, supra note 72.  
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development, the application of Smart Growth policy and practices 
to agreement formation helps ensure projects create desirable 
infrastructure to best serve public needs.153 Smart Growth 
practices also minimize environmental harms of infrastructure 
development by addressing unnecessarily wasteful and impactful 
patterns of human development.154 Despite federal support for 
Smart Growth practices, its principles and methods are largely 
derived from the sprawl-friendly Plan.155 State and local 
governments must therefore work to implement multilateral 
Smart Growth initiatives to help address the harmful 
environmental and economic impacts of P3 projects discussed 
above. 
No universal definition exists to describe the group of 
development and land management policies known as Smart 
Growth. To the EPA, Smart Growth comprises “a range of 
development and conservation strategies that help protect our 
health and natural environment and make our communities more 
attractive, economically stronger, and more socially diverse.”156 
Academics consider Smart Growth “a necessary, balanced land use 
planning device.”157 The Urban Land Institute’s (“ULI”) definition 
of Smart Growth reads “an evolving approach to development,” 
with the goal “to balance economic progress with environmental 
protection and quality of life.”158 Another organization, the 
American Planning Association (“APA”), focuses on the creation of 
community, equitable development, fiscal responsibility, and 
integration of long-range, regional, and sustainable development 
 
153. See Edward T. Canuel, Supporting Smart Growth Legislation and 
Audits: An Analysis of U.S. and Canadian Land Planning Theories and Tools, 13 
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 309, 346 (2005) (supporting implementation of Smart Growth 
regulations despite the critique that developers may find such regulations 
complex to navigate). Some states, such as Maryland, chose to make Smart 
Growth review practices encouraged but not mandatory to minimize such 
critiques. Gerrit-Jan Knapp & Dru Schmidt-Perkins, Smart Growth in Maryland: 
Facing a New Reality, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND & POL’Y 9, 10 (2006), 
https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/articles/smart-growth-maryland 
[https://perma.cc/KES8-ESYN]. 
154. See Siemiatycki, supra note 38, at 6–7. 
155. THE PLAN, supra note 7.  
156. About Smart Growth, supra note 149.  
157. Canuel, supra note 153, at 309. 
158. Id. at 313. 
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viewpoints.159 Each definition reflects the underlying basis of the 
Smart Growth Principles. 
The ten Smart Growth Principals form the policy’s 
methodological basis. P3 agreements that apply these principles 
during agreement-formation would consider the following 
practices: integration of mixed land uses, creation of walkable 
neighborhoods, preservation of open space and critical 
environmental areas, direction of development toward existing 
communities, provision of various transportation options, and 
encouragement of community-stakeholder collaboration.160 P3 
agreements for infrastructure projects that adopt elements of 
Smart Growth will receive the proven benefits of these 
considerations, including, but not limited to, the expansion of 
economic activity and increased environmental protection.161 
Regulatory Smart Growth review can provide a list of factors 
used by parties to determine the adherence of a project to Smart 
Growth principles.162 Based on the mantra “Save Money by Taking 
Better Care of What You Have,” compulsory review can save public 
partners money by supporting the dedication of funds to the 
maintenance of existing structures and freeing limited funds for 
 
159. See APA Policy Guide on Smart Growth, AM. PLAN. ASSOC. (Apr. 14, 
2012),https://www.planning.org/policy/guides/adopted/smartgrowth.htm 
[https://perma.cc/X78W-X34T] [hereinafter APA Policy Guide of Smart Growth]. 
160. See What is Smart Growth?, SMART GROWTH AM. (2017), 
https://smartgrowthamerica.org/our-vision/what-is-smart-growth/ 
[https://perma.cc/AT3A-BUDH] (providing the full list of 10 Smart Growth 
Principles). 
161. The Project for Code Reform, CONG. FOR THE NEW URBANISM, 
https://www.cnu.org/our-projects/project-code-reform [https://perma.cc/QJ4X-
FZFS]. 
162. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 6-0101, 6-0105 (McKinney 2010) 
(establishing the New York State Smart Growth Public Infrastructure Policy Act, 
which requires review of any infrastructure development for the maximization of 
“the social, economic and environmental benefits from public infrastructure . . . 
through minimiz[ation of] unnecessary costs of sprawl development including 
environmental degradation, disinvestment in urban and suburban communities 
and loss of open space induced by sprawl facilitated by the funding or development 
of new or expanded transportation . . . infrastructure”); see also Heidi 
Mouillesseaux-Kunzman et al., New York State’s Smart Growth Public 
Infrastructure Policy Act of 2010: Implementation Through 2014 and Significance 
for Local Government, 17 CARDI REPORTS (May 
2015), https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/55993/CaRDI_Repor
ts-17-final.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y/ [https://perma.cc/UCC2-SGZT]. 
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the maintenance and repair of existing infrastructure.163 States, 
municipalities, and private parties that support Smart Growth 
approaches believe these programs help grow state, regional, and 
local economies through strategic investment.164 The APA 
“recognizes the tremendous economic growth potential” of Smart 
Growth tools like infill development and suburban corridor retrofit 
that present “existing suburban corridors with the opportunity to 
create more efficient development patterns that allow for a wider 
variety of economic opportunity, access, and placemaking.”165 
These funding and investment policies have been termed “smart 
lending.”166 
The environmental benefits of Smart Growth infrastructure 
development are also widely acknowledged. Smart Growth seeks 
to minimize future environmental harms of infrastructure 
expansion by addressing unnecessarily wasteful and impactful 
patterns of human development.167 The EPA states that, 
“development guided by [S]mart [G]rowth principles can minimize 
air and water pollution, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
encourage cleanup and reuse of contaminated properties, and 
preserve natural lands.”168 Furthermore, Smart Growth practices 
that promote compact development, safeguard environmentally 
sensitive areas, mix land uses, and support public transit can 
lessen the need for new infrastructure.169 The affordability of 
infrastructure maintenance and development relates directly to 
the unsustainable pattern of suburban sprawl.170 To address this, 
 
163. APA Policy Guide on Smart Growth, supra note 159, at 1 (“the [APA] 
recognizes that maintaining, expanding, and optimizing the use of existing or 
prior public infrastructure investments resulting in more rational and efficient 
use of limited public resources and helps to preserve the natural environment”); 
see also SMART GROWTH AM., IOWA SMART TRANSPORTATION: SAVE MONEY AND 
GROW THE ECONOMY 2 (2011), 
https://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/app/legacy/documents/smart-
transportation-iowa.pdf [https://perma.cc/L23Q-TNN2] [hereinafter IOWA SMART 
TRANSPORTATION]. 
164. See IOWA SMART TRANSPORTATION, supra note 163, at 3–5.   
165. APA Policy Guide on Smart Growth, supra note 159, at 1. 
166. 1 JAMES A. KUSHNER, SUBDIVISION LAW & GROWTH MANAGEMENT § 2.12 
(2d ed. 2019).   
167. See Siemiatycki supra note 38, at 6–7. 
168. About Smart Growth, supra note 149, at 4.  
169. Id.  
170. SPRAWL RETROFIT INITIATIVE: THE CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM, 
THE UNBEARABLE COSTS OF SPRAWL, 
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the Smart Growth practice of infill development promotes the 
redevelopment of existing structures or development on already 
developed land.171 Another practice, transit-oriented development, 
focuses on mixed-use projects located near current transit 
infrastructure or where expansion of transit infrastructure is least 
impactful.172 Smart Growth legislation, regulation, and advisory 
programs that favor infrastructure projects that integrate these 
practices not only contain sprawl, they function to provide 
ridership and funding to transit systems, reduce automobile and 
road usage, and minimize the need for additional highway and 
roadway infrastructure.173 The benefits of Smart Growth policy 
and practices clearly possess the capability to counter the 
weaknesses of P3 agreements that can harm the public’s interests. 
V. EXISTING STATE LEGISLATION: A 
MARYLAND CASE STUDY 
P3 agreements and Smart Growth practices are both 
necessary tools in the modern era of infrastructure redevelopment. 
States have already begun to employ aspects of both through 
legislation, regulation, and administrative guidance. Past 
experience with P3s around the nation provides insight into the 
ways that P3 agreements for public infrastructure projects might 
inherently harm the public’s environmental and economic 
interests. To minimize these harms, state P3 legislation may direct 
state agencies to adopt specific processes for P3 agreement 
formation.174 Such regulations would aid municipal officials in 
 
https://www.cnu.org/sites/default/files/SPRAWL-RETROFIT-UNB_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/38KE-DRYE].  
171. What is Infill and Redevelopment?, COMPLETE COMMUNITIES TOOLBOX, 
https://www.completecommunitiesde.org/planning/landuse/what-is-infill/ 
[https://perma.cc/2SPD-RJ9G]. 
172. HIROAKI SUZUKI ET AL., TRANSFORMING CITIES WITH TRANSIT: TRANSIT 
AND LAND-USE INTEGRATION FOR SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT 37–38 (2013), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 
947211468162273111/pdf/Main-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TPM-RQQR]; see 
also Transit-Oriented Development, FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION, 
https://www.transit.dot.gov/TOD [https://perma.cc/3FDN-J6YV]. 
173. See SUZUKI, supra note 172, at 13–14 (discussing the substantial capital 
investments necessary to develop a transit system). 
174. Bolen et al., supra note 123, at 5–8 (listing states by the Smart Growth 
efforts each had adopted up until 2001); Canuel, supra note 153, at 341–343 
(discussing Maryland’s Smart Growth legislation and programs).   
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ensuring that the public’s environmental and economic interests 
are protected.175  State P3 legislation can also protect less-powerful 
players in infrastructure development, such as subcontractors and 
material suppliers concerned with inadequate payment assurances 
in P3 projects.176 As of November 2014, nine states “require the 
private-partner and the prime contractor to provide performance 
and payment bonds” on P3 projects.177 
Smart Growth legislation that requires regulatory Smart 
Growth review of all P3 infrastructure projects can further 
minimize harms to the public. In theory, P3 legislation can 
integrate Smart Growth considerations to address concerns with 
P3s, as well as shortcomings, such as the lack of federal funding 
support for improving and expanding urban-transit. The 
integration of Smart Practices into P3 legislation and regulation, 
or passage of separate but complementary legislation, will work to 
prepare states and municipalities to negotiate P3 agreements, that 
of which provide for public input in project development and 
prioritize compact development patterns. The subsequent case 
study of a recent P3 agreement in Maryland in light of the state’s 
underlying P3 and Smart Growth laws reveals final lessons on how 
state legislation must be structured to ensure reduction of public 
harms to the greatest extent possible. 
Despite Maryland’s extensive history as a state leader in 
Smart Growth policy, it struggled to protect the public interest in 
recent state-level P3 agreements due to the structure of the state’s 
P3 legislation.178 A P3 law intended to bring investments to 
 
175. Key to Unlock Potential Investors, supra note 72. Some P3 laws already 
direct contracting partners to contemplate protection of the public interest when 
providing for risks in P3 agreements, such as when a private partner fails to 
deliver. Id. An example would be if the private operator of toll road cannot pay 
and files bankruptcy, the contract provides how the toll road still pays at least 
partly for itself. Id. 
176. 33 States, Including Maryland, Have Enacted Laws Authorizing Public 
Agencies to Enter into Private-Public Partnerships, 38 CONSTR. CONT. L. REP. 6, at 
¶ 247.33 (Nov. 7, 2014) (this concern arises when P3 agreements are exempt from 
mechanic’s liens and payment bond requirements) [hereinafter 33 States].   
177. Id. (The states that joined Maryland are Florida, Maine, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, California, and Ohio.) 
178. See Canuel, supra note 153, at 341–45; see also Pete Tomao, Larry 
Hogan Couldn’t Have Canceled the Red Line So Easily if a New Bill Had Been 
Law, GREATER GREATER WASH. (Mar. 1, 2016), https://ggwash.org/view/40913/ 
hogan-couldnt-have-canceled-the-red-line-so-easily-if-a-new-bill-had-been-law 
[https://perma.cc/6WNT-RJXF] (discussing how Maryland needed new legislation 
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Baltimore’s terminally underfunded urban transit systems, HB 
560 (Maryland’s P3 Law), instead became the catalyst for the 
cancelation of existing transit projects in exchange for the 
expansion of congested highways and the construction of high-
speed toll lanes.179  Maryland’s experience with the application of 
its P3 legislation exemplifies how state legislatures should retain 
a check on executive control over state-level P3 agreements, and 
how explicit inclusion of Smart Growth review practices offers one 
such possible check and P3 laws should not be structured to avoid 
such review. 
The use of Maryland’s P3 Law to fund and construct 
problematic high-speed toll lanes goes against prior Smart Growth 
policy in Maryland.180 Since 1997, Maryland incrementally 
adopted new programs and initiatives that became collectively 
referred to as the “Smart, Green, and Growing” legislative package 
under Governor Martin O’Malley, a Smart Growth-friendly 
Democrat.181 Some praised Maryland’s previous Smart Growth 
program before O’Malley for a structure that used incentives to 
encourage developers to focus development in Priority Funding 
Areas (“PFAs”), “communities and places where local governments 
 
in 2016 to prevent Hogan from reducing state aid for transit projects and 
supporting highway projects that promote urban-sprawl); see also Press Release, 
Martin O’Malley, Maryland Dep’t of the Env’t, Governor Martin O’Malley 
Announces Legislation to Reduce Global Warming Pollution (Jan. 23, 2009), 
https://mde.maryland.gov/programs/Pressroom/Pages/1165.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/4FBU-F9X2] (on file with author) (asserting that, prior to 
Hogan’s policy changes, O’Malley recognized climate change as a threat to 
Maryland’s public interests that mass transit improvements could help address) 
[hereinafter O’Malley Announces Legislation]. 
179. H.B. 560, 440th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2009); Erin Cox & Luke 
Broadwater, Under State Law, Opponents to Hogan’s $9B Toll Lane Plan Have 
Little Recourse, BALTIMORE SUN (Sept. 22, 
2017), https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-hogan-highway-p3-
story.html [https://perma.cc/5NFP-L7YC]; Andrew Zaleski, A $9 Billion Highway 
That Promises to Pay for Itself, CITYLAB (Sept. 26, 2017), 
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2017/09/a-9-billion-highway-that-
promises-to-pay-for-itself/541119/ [https://perma.cc/85KT-XDGD]; 33 States, 
supra note 176, at ¶ 247.33;. 
180. See Tomao, supra note 178. 
181. Id.; see also Parris N. Glendening, Maryland’s Smart Growth Initiative: 
The Next Steps, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1493, 1493 (2002) (discussing Maryland’s 
Smart Growth initiatives up until 2002); O’Malley Announces Legislation, supra 
note 178.  
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want State funding for future growth.”182 Critiques of the 
program’s success of directing growth into the PFAs influenced 
O’Malley to pass laws “intended ‘to strengthen and reinvigorate 
the fundamental tools of Smart Growth’” and “to protect the 
environment of Maryland, promote higher density development in 
existing communities, and to encourage sustainable growth.”183 
Through this legislative package, O’Malley sought to support the 
expansion of transit projects and budgeted nearly $700 million 
towards the construction of the Red Line, a “proposed 14-mile east-
west light rail line [intended to run] between Woodlawn in 
Baltimore County and the Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center 
in east Baltimore.”184 One may reasonably conclude that O’Malley 
signed P3 legislation with the intent of funding Smart-Growth 
oriented transit projects. 
O’Malley’s infrastructure policies align with generally agreed 
upon Smart Growth principles that investment in roadway 
expansions through the addition of high-speed toll lanes offers only 
a temporary fix to congestion. Not only does funding extensive toll 
lane expansions fail to address aging urban infrastructure, but 
widened roadways return to pre-expansion levels of congestion in 
as little as one-year due to the phenomenon of induced demand.185 
 
182. David Beste, Growing Pains: Maryland’s Struggle to Introduce Smart 
Growth to a Growing Population, 18 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 79, 88 n.40 (2010) 
(quoting MD. DEP’T OF PLANNING, SMART, GREEN, AND GROWING PLANNING GUIDE 7 
(2010), 
http://planning.maryland.gov/PDF/OurProducts/Publications/otherPublications/
SGG_Guide_ 09_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KLJ-X9AY]; Gerrit-Jan Knapp & 
Dru Schmidt-Perkins, supra note 153; see also Canuel, supra note 153, at 342, 
343.  
183. Beste, supra note 182, at 83; see also Tomao, supra note 178.  
184. See Associated Press, O’Malley Announces $690M for Red Line in 
Baltimore, DAILY RECORD (Sept. 4, 2013), 
https://thedailyrecord.com/2013/09/04/omalley-announces-690m-for-red-line-in-
baltimore/ [https://perma.cc/3PQT-ZV6V] (reporting O’Malley’s allocation of 
another $246 million for the replacement of Baltimore’s 100-rail cars and 
signaling systems). 
185. Gilles Duranton & Matthew A. Turner, The Fundamental Law of Road 
Congestion: Evidence from US Cities, 101 AM. ECONOMIC REVIEW 2616, 2645-46 
(2011), https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.101.6.2616 
[https://perma.cc/DW3K-R38Z]; Angie Schmitt, The Science is Clear: More 
Highways Equals More Traffic. Why are DOTs Still Ignoring it?, 
STREETSBLOGUSA (June 21, 2017), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2017/06/21/the-
science-is-clear-more-highways-equals-more-traffic-why-are-dots-still-ignoring-
it/ [https://perma.cc/NZ22-LCJ8]; Zaleski, supra note 179, at 3. 
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Those who support this perspective say that decreasing the 
number of cars on existing roadways is the key to congestion 
reduction.186 Improving and expanding mass transit to increase 
availability and ensure reliability, increases transit ridership, 
helps to reduce the number of auto-commuters, and relieves 
congestion.187 
The Red Line Project never came to fruition because of the 
structure of Maryland’s P3 Law and the election of Republican 
Governor Larry Hogan in 2014.188 Passed in 2013 by then-
Governor O’Malley, HB 560 authorized state agencies to “adopt 
regulations and establish processes. . .”189 Drafted by a Democrat-
controlled legislature with a Democratic governor, Maryland’s P3 
Law failed to provide any useful means for later legislatures or 
administrators to check executive implementation.190 Instead, 
Maryland’s P3 Law allows any sitting Governor to avoid the state 
legislature’s traditional budgetary approval powers by entering 
into major P3 agreements solely through Maryland’s 
Transportation’s Authority.191 In addition, Maryland’s P3 law did 
not require such projects to adhere to existing Smart Growth 
policies. 
After his election, Hogan used Maryland’s P3 Law to facilitate 
the addition of hundreds of miles of toll lanes to three of the state’s 
most congested highways.192 Under the loophole provided in 
 
186. Eric Jaffe, Does Light Rail Really Alleviate Highway Congestion?, 
CITYLAB (Feb. 29, 2012), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2012/02/does-
light-rail-really-alleviate-highway-congestion/1358/ [https://perma.cc/CF34-
2FHG] (reviewing Sutapa Bhattacharjee & Andrew R. Goetz, Impact of Light Rail 
on Traffic Congestion in Denver, 22 J. OF TRANSPORT GEOGRAPHY 262 (May 2012)). 
187. Id; see also Anderson, supra note 33, at 2–4.  
188. Christian Schaffer, Governor Hogan Defends Decision to Cancel the Red 
Line, WMAR BALTIMORE (Oct. 30, 2018), 
https://www.wmar2news.com/news/political/governor-hogan-defends-decision-to-
cancel-the-red-line [https://perma.cc/R8BQ-TNUU]. 
189. H.B. 560, 440th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2009); 33 States, supra 
note 176, at 1 (authorizing such agencies as: (1) the Department of General 
Services; (2) the Maryland Department of Transportation; (3) the Maryland 
Transportation Authority; (4) and certain higher education institutions); Cox & 
Broadwater, supra note 179.  
190. Cox & Broadwater, supra note 179. 
191. H.B. 560. 
192. Cox & Broadwater, supra note 179 (discussing Hogan’s plan to add four 
toll-lanes to I-270 at a cost of $6 to 7 billion, and to have Maryland finance $1.4 
billion of toll lane construction on the Baltimore-Washington Parkway). 
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Maryland’s P3 Law approach, Hogan’s plans required approval 
only from the Board of Public Works, a three-member body 
comprised of the governor himself and two others.193 The P3 
legislation allowed for private developer to offer proposals for how, 
when, and where to build the new lanes that require expansions 
into abutting communities, with no assurance of Smart Growth 
review to help ensure community involvement in the plan 
development process. To fund these agreements, Hogan also 
cancelled O’Malley’s Red Line project.194 Hogan relied on the 
immediate economic benefit of the P3-DBF model – that the 
agreement costs taxpayers nothing now – to garner public 
support.195 Support resulted despite either the agreement’s failure 
to consider a regional perspective, or failure to integrate public 
concerns into a determination of which infrastructure  
developments, through P3 agreements, could fix two problematic 
situations: the congestion on three of Maryland’s major highways 
and the inadequacies plaguing urban transit and state-wide 
rails.196 Thus, the prior legislature’s creation of a streamlined 
approval process for P3 agreements, which failed to integrate the 
state’s existing Smart Growth laws, inadequately provided future 
legislative or administrative checks over the formation of P3 
agreements. Ultimately, this process failed to reflect the Smart 
Growth-friendly policies of the drafting-legislature. Consequently, 
states should learn from this and seek to explicitly integrate Smart 
Growth review for individual agreements into P3 legislation and 
regulation. 
 
193. H.B. 560. 
194. Michael Dresser & Luke Broadwater, Hogan Says No to Red Line, Yes 
to Purple, BALTIMORE SUN (June 25, 2015), 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-hogan-transportation-20150624-
story.html [https://perma.cc/6L46-TMGX] (“By eliminating the expense of the Red 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
With dwindling funds available for surface transportation 
projects, many governments depend increasingly on P3 
agreements to finance infrastructure projects.197  In consideration 
of these shortcomings, state-level legislation should: (1) minimize 
risks to the public-partner posed by high interest rates and 
potential loss of control over fee rates and service quality, (2) 
actively facilitate public input and consultation in P3 agreement 
formation (possibly through the integration of Smart Growth 
policy), (3) help governments determine a project’s appropriateness 
a for the P3 model, (4) provide for P3 renegotiation procedures in 
the event of unforeseen or unfavorable outcomes, and (5) facilitate 
production of guidance materials by state agencies to improve 
municipal familiarity with P3s. State legislatures should explicitly 
require Smart Growth review for all infrastructure projects to help 
provide a check on executive P3 legislation implementation and 
ensure the protection of the public’s environmental and economic 
interests to the greatest extent possible. 
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